Racial Segregation and the Black-White Test Score Gap by David Card & Jesse Rothstein
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
RACIAL SEGREGATION AND THE









We are grateful to the Andrew Mellon Foundation and the College Board for assistance in obtaining the SAT
data used in this study, and to Jacob Vigdor, Jon Guryan, and Sarah Reber for supplying other data.  We
thank Florence Neymotin and Ashley Miller for outstanding research assistance, and Ken Chay, Nicole
Fortin, Jeff Kling, Thomas Lemieux, Justin McCrary, and seminar participants at Berkeley, Columbia,
Syracuse, Yale, NBER, and the Universities of Connecticut, Illinois, and Maryland for helpful comments and
suggestions.  Card’s research was supported by a grant from the NICHD and Rothstein’s by Princeton’s
Center for Economic Policy Studies.  The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2006 by David Card and Jesse Rothstein.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.Racial Segregation and the Black-White Test Score Gap
David Card and Jesse Rothstein
NBER Working Paper No. 12078
March 2006
JEL No. H73, I20, J18, J24, R20
ABSTRACT
Racial segregation is often blamed for some of the achievement gap between blacks and whites. We
study the effects of school and neighborhood segregation on the relative SAT scores of black
students across different metropolitan areas, using large microdata samples for the 1998-2001 test
cohorts. Our models include detailed controls for the family background of individual test-takers,
school-level  controls  for  selective  participation  in  the  test,  and  city-level  controls  for  racial
composition, income, and region. We find robust evidence that the black-white test score gap is
higher in more segregated cities. Holding constant family background and other factors, a shift from
a fully segregated to a completely integrated city closes about one-quarter of the raw black-white gap
in SAT scores. Specifications that distinguish between school and neighborhood segregation suggest
that neighborhood segregation has a consistently negative impact but that school segregation has no
independent effect (though we cannot reject equality of the two effects). We find similar results
using Census-based data on schooling outcomes for youth in different cities. Data on enrollment in
honors courses suggest that within-school segregation increases when schools are more highly
integrated, potentially offsetting the benefits of school desegregation and accounting for our findings.
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  The racial gap in student achievement is a pervasive and divisive feature of American 
life.  Black-white differences in standardized test scores lie at the core of the debate over 
affirmative action in college admissions (Bowen and Bok, 1998; Kane, 1998) and public 
sector hiring (McCrary, 2004), and figure prominently in the recent No Child Left Behind 
Act.  Many years before the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board decision, segregation was 
identified as a possible factor in the academic achievement of black children.
1  Studies since 
the Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966) have found that test scores are lower at schools with 
higher black enrollment shares (see, e.g., Ferguson 1998, and the review by Schofield 1995).  
Likewise, there is a strong negative correlation between education outcomes and the fraction 
of black residents in a neighborhood (e.g., Massey and Denton, 1993).  
  Establishing whether segregation actually causes lower achievement is difficult, 
however, because individuals are not randomly assigned to neighborhoods or schools.
2  A 
credible research design has to address the possibility that students who attend schools with 
larger black enrollment shares – or live in predominantly black neighborhoods – have other 
characteristics that contribute to their lower achievement.  In this paper, we circumvent the 
endogeneity of school and neighborhood choice by aggregating to the metropolitan level and 
relating the black-white achievement gap in a metropolitan area to black-white differences in 
relative exposure to minority neighbors and schoolmates.
3  Differencing eliminates the 
effects of city-wide variables that may be correlated with racial segregation (such as the level 
                                                           
1 Crowley (1932) presents an early study of the effect of racially segregated schools on academic achievement, 
based on comparisons of test scores for black students in two all-black and four mixed-race schools in 
Cincinnati.   She constructed matched samples from the two groups of schools, matching on age, grade, and 
IQ, and found no difference in achievement test scores between the schools. 
2 On the general problem of inferring peer group effects from observational data, see Manski (1993) and Brock 
and Durlauf (2001). 
3 Although cities with segregated neighborhoods tend to have segregated schools, school segregation also 
depends on institutional features like the number of school districts (Urquiola, 2005) and the presence of 
desegregation programs (Reber, 2005).  We show below that the two have substantial independent variation.  2 
of school spending or the efficiency of local schools).
 4  We also control for a rich set of 
measured differences in the family backgrounds of test-takers, and for other variables, like 
city size and income inequality, that may affect black student’s relative achievement.  We 
apply this approach to a large sample of SAT-takers from the 1998-2001 cohorts of high 
school graduates. 
  We reach two main conclusions.  First, there is a robust and quantitatively important 
relationship between black relative test scores and the degree of segregation in different 
metropolitan areas.  Our estimates suggest that the move from a highly segregated city to an 
integrated city is associated with a 45 point narrowing of the black-white SAT gap – about 
one-quarter of the raw differential.  Second, neighborhood segregation seems to matter more 
than school segregation: In models that include both measures we consistently find that 
neighborhood segregation exerts a strong negative effect on relative test scores, whereas the 
effects of school segregation are small and statistically insignificant.  We cannot reject, 
however, that the two have equal effects. 
  These findings are robust to a variety of specifications and estimation strategies.  We 
focus on two main problems that might lead us to overstate the effects of segregation: 
differential sorting of white and black families across different cities, and the possibility that 
segregation is affected by the relative abilities of black and white students in a city.   We 
show that our estimated segregation effects are unaffected by including a control for the 
residual wage gap between black and white workers in a city, which should proxy for 
unobserved family background differences that would result from either source of 
endogeneity.   We also examine the changing inter-city distributions of higher- and lower-
educated whites and blacks and find no evidence of selective migration, once we control for 
                                                           
4 Throughout this paper we use “cities” to refer to metropolitan areas – specifically, Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA’s) or, in the largest urbanized areas, Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs).  3 
observed city characteristics.  Finally, we show that measures of residential and school 
segregation in a city are highly persistent, and therefore unlikely to be responsive to recent 
shocks to unobserved student ability.  Even controlling for neighborhood segregation the 
remaining component of school segregation is extremely stable, suggesting that the small 
school segregation coefficients cannot be attributed to measurement error in this variable.   
A third potential concern is selective participation in the SAT.  Our analyses all point 
to the conclusion that, if anything, sample selection leads our results to understate the effects 
of segregation on black relative achievement.  As a robustness check, however, we estimate a 
series of models using 2000 Census data on schooling outcomes of 16-24 year olds.  
Estimates from these models are similar to our SAT results. 
  The finding that black relative achievement is unaffected by differences in school 
segregation, once we control for neighborhood segregation, leads us to consider the role of 
within-school segregation.  Holding constant the level of neighborhood segregation, white 
students are more likely to enroll in honors classes in cities with more integrated schools, 
whereas blacks are not.  This behavior is consistent with the presence of ability tracking 
programs that offset the integrative effects of between-school desegregation efforts 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, 2003; Clotfelter, 2004), and may help to explain why 
differences in school segregation have little effect on black relative achievement.  
We conclude with an analysis that attempts to distinguish between the direct effects 
of racial segregation and “indirect” effects operating through school quality and the relative 
exposure of black and white students to lower income peers.  Measures of relative school 
quality are uncorrelated with the relative exposure of black students to minority neighbors or 
schools, so the potential for these variables to contribute to observed segregation effects is 
very small. On the other hand, segregation is highly correlated with exposure to low-income  4 
peers at both the school and neighborhood levels.   Consistent with our finding that 
minority exposure at the school level has little or no effect on black relative achievement 
(holding constant neighborhood exposure), exposure to high-poverty schoolmates also has 
no effect.  But relative neighborhood income does seem to be an important determinant of 
test score gaps, and accounts for as much as half of our estimated residential segregation 
effects. 
 
II.  The Effects of Segregated Schools and Neighborhoods on Student Achievement 
a. Theoretical Channels 
  The literature has identified four mechanisms through which racial or ethnic 
segregation might affect the educational achievement of black students.  First, what might be 
called “direct” exposure effects arise in peer group models where minorities have lower 
expectations or aspirations than non-minorities (all else held constant).  For example, models 
of race-based cultural norms (e.g., Ogbu and Forham, 1986; Ogbu, 2003) assert that black 
children have lower norms of achievement than otherwise similar whites, and that exposure 
to peers with lower aspirations reduces achievement.  Since segregation by definition raises 
the relative exposure of black students to black peers, pure exposure effects create a link 
from segregation to the black-white achievement gap.
5 
  A second set of “indirect” exposure effects arise from the correlation between 
minority status and other characteristics that may negatively effect achievement.  Black 
children, for example, are more likely to have a single parent than white children.  If single-
parent families have lower educational aspirations, and if student performance is affected by 
                                                           
5 A similar prediction arises from Austen-Smith and Fryer’s (2005) model of endogenous peer group 
interactions, although in this model the negative effect of black peers reaches a peak when the fraction black is 
½, and disappears in an all-black setting.  This model also predicts that the negative effects of exposure to 
black peers are concentrated among black children with low potential achievement, whereas Ogbu’s (2003) 
study focuses on black children with high potential achievement.  5 
peer aspirations (Coleman, 1966; Sewell and Hauser, 1975) then a rise in segregation will 
lower the relative achievement of black children.  
  While theoretically important, the distinction between direct and indirect exposure 
effects is empirically inaccessible.  An important example is test score performance (Hoxby, 
2000).  Suppose that a given student’s achievement is affected by the average academic 
ability of his or her classmates.  Since black students have lower test scores than whites, and 
much of this gap is unexplained by observed family background factors, one could argue 
that a higher fraction of black peers exerts a direct exposure effect via the academic ability of 
the peer group.  Alternatively, one could argue that the black-white test score gap reflects 
unmeasured background factors, and is properly interpreted as an indirect exposure effect.  
In our main analysis we make no distinction between direct and indirect exposure effects, 
although in later specifications we estimate minority exposure effects holding constant 
exposure to low-income schoolmates and neighbors. 
  Another channel through which racial or ethnic exposure could indirectly affect 
relative achievement is through differences in school quality that are correlated with the 
racial composition of schools.  In the pre-Brown v. Board era, separate school systems made it 
possible for white voters to divert resources from black to white schools (Boozer, Krueger, 
and Wolkon, 1992).  Even today, concerns over differential resources are central to litigation 
over school finance rules (Schrag, 2003) and to accountability rules that hold schools 
responsible for race-specific achievement levels. 
  Finally, there may be “macro” influences that create a direct link from segregation to 
black relative achievement.  If, for example, the nature of the local broadcast media varies 
across cities—with, perhaps, more racially targeted radio stations in cities with more 
segregation—exposure to the media culture could produce effects of city-level segregation  6 
even on children who live in racially mixed neighborhoods.  Models of statistical 
discrimination (e.g. Coate and Loury, 1993) could yield similar results. Students’ education 
choices might be influenced by local (white) employers’ attitudes toward blacks, which might 
in turn depend on the extent of employers’ exposure to black neighbors and schoolmates.  
These models imply impacts of city-level segregation that extend beyond any direct effects 
of neighborhood- and school-level exposure. 
 
b.  Previous Evidence on Peer Group and Segregation Effects 
  Much of the existing literature has equated the effect of segregation with that of 
school-level exposure to black or minority peers, and has documented that student 
achievement is lower in schools with a higher fraction of black or minority students.  
Coleman (1966), for example, found that black students earned lower test scores at schools 
with a higher black enrollment share.  As subsequent critics have emphasized, the 
interpretation of these findings is clouded by the lack of controls for the non-random sorting 
of students to different types of schools (see e.g., Jencks and Mayer, 1990). 
  Recent researchers have adopted three main approaches to address the sorting issue:  
(1) using within-school variation in minority exposure; (2) using experimental or quasi-
experimental variation in exposure; and (3) aggregating to a level at which sorting is arguably 
reduced or eliminated. 
  Hoxby (2000) and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002) follow the first approach.  
Both studies relate the achievement (or achievement growth) of students in different cohorts 
at the same school with the racial and ethnic composition of their particular cohort.  This 
research design assumes that, while students may sort across schools on the basis of long-
run factors like average racial composition, choices are unaffected by cohort-specific  7 
variation in these factors.
6  Both papers find very large exposure effects.  The estimates 
reported by Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002), for example, imply that excess exposure of 
black students to black grademates causes the black-white test score gap to grow by 0.07 
standard deviations with each year in school, enough to account for most of the black-white 
test score gap by 12
th grade.
7 
  Experimental evidence on the effects of neighborhood peers comes from the recent 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) project, which offered incentives for public housing 
residents to move to lower poverty neighborhoods (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2006).  MTO had a 
modest effect on the quality of subjects’ neighborhoods (lowering the poverty rate by about 
13 percentage points), but no significant effect on children’s academic achievement.  The 
experiment has very limited power to measure the effect of exposure to minority neighbors, 
however, since it only lowered the fraction of minority neighbors of the treatment group by 
about 7 percentage points.
8    
  Guryan (2004) conducts a quasi-experimental analysis of the effect of school 
segregation on black dropout rates, using variation in the scope and timing of major court-
ordered desegregation plans in the 1970s and 1980s.  He finds a modest but statistically 
significant effect, with black dropout rates falling 3 percentage points relative to whites as a 
result of policies that on average reduced relative black exposure to black schoolmates by 
                                                           
6 As in other contexts – for example between-twin estimates of returns to schooling (Bound and Solon, 1999) – 
it is unclear whether this strategy reduces the covariance between racial exposure and unobserved ability 
relative to the remaining variation in exposure.  An additional concern in the Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 
(2002) study is that there may be systematic trends in the ethnic composition of schools that covary with trends 
in average student characteristics at the school.  Hoxby (2000) pays special attention to such trend factors. 
7 This is based on Hanushek, Kane, and Rivkin’s (2002) computation that integration would reduce the black 
share in the average black student’s classroom by 25 percentage points and raise the black share in the average 
white student’s classroom by 5 percentage points.  Using their estimated exposure effects (which vary by race), 
this would narrow the gap in gain scores by 0.07 (in standard deviations of level scores) per year, for a 
cumulative effect over 12 years of 0.83 standard deviations.  A key implication of their model is that the black-
white test score gap rises with grade.  This is not evident in aggregate data (Perie et al., 2005). 
8 See Sanbonmatsu et. al (2006), Table 2.  See also Jacob’s (2004) study of the effect of housing project 
demolitions, which yields similar results but has similar limitations.   8 
about 20 percentage points.
9  
  A final strand of recent research uses an aggregate research design similar to our 
own.  Although students of differing abilities may sort to different schools or neighborhoods 
within a given city, these studies assume that the distribution of potential abilities across 
metropolitan areas is as good as random (conditional on observed control variables).  Evans, 
Oates, and Schwab (1992) use the average characteristics of the metropolitan area as 
instruments for peer group characteristics.  Cutler and Glaeser (1997) extend this idea by 
distinguishing between the outcomes of blacks and whites in the same city, under the weaker 
assumption that the black-white difference in potential ability in a city is unrelated to the 
degree of residential segregation.  Our basic framework is very similar.  We extend Cutler 
and Glaeser’s (1997) analysis by including a much richer set of family background and 
metropolitan-level control variables that may be correlated with segregation, by 
distinguishing between the effects of school and neighborhood exposure, and by focusing 
on test scores as a measure of achievement. 
 
c. Empirical Specification  
We begin by assuming that the test score of a given student depends on his or her 
own characteristics, the racial composition of his or her school and neighborhood, other 
characteristics of schoolmates and neighbors, and an unobserved error with school- and 
neighborhood-level components that may vary by race.  Specifically, we assume: 
 (1)  yijsnc  =  Xijsncαj  + Zsc βj   +  Wnc νj  +   Bsc γj   +  Rnc δj  +  ujsc  + vjnc +   εijsc , 
where yijsnc represents the test score (or some alternative measure of achievement) of student 
                                                           
9 As we discuss below, it is possible that in the longer run some of the integrative effect of desegregation 
programs is offset by a rise in within-school segregation.  Guryan’s (2004) estimates, which identify segregation 
effects on the earliest affected cohorts, would not incorporate such offsetting effects.  9 
i of race group j who attends school s and lives in neighborhood n in city c,  Xijsnc is a vector 
of characteristics of the student,  Zsc is a vector representing the average characteristics of 
the students in school s and other features of the school,  Wnc is a vector of the average 
characteristics of the neighborhood, Bsc represents the fraction of minority students in 
school s, Rnc is the fraction of minority residents in the neighborhood, ujsc is a shared error 
component for students of group j in school s and city c, vjnc is a similar error component for 
residents of group j in neighborhood n, and εijnsc is an individual-level error (with mean 0 for 
each race group in each school and neighborhood).
10  The coefficients γj and δj capture the 
direct effects of exposure to minority schoolmates and neighbors, while indirect effects 
would arise from omission of components of Z and W that are correlated with B and R.   
  Any non-randomness in the sorting of students to schools or neighborhoods 
produces a correlation between the unobserved error components in equation (1) and the 
measures of school- and neighborhood-level exposure, potentially biasing OLS estimates of 
γj and δj from student-level data.  The effects of non-random sorting within a city can be 
eliminated by averaging the achievement outcomes of each race group to the city level.  
Specifically, equation (1) implies that the mean outcome of group j in city c is: 
(1’) yjc =   Xjc αj   + Zjc  βj  +  Wjc  νj  +   Bjcγj  +   Rjc δj  +  μjc, 
where Xjc represents the mean characteristics of students of group j in city c,  Zjc and Wjc 
represent the mean characteristics of the school-level and neighborhood-level peer groups of 
race-j students,  Bjc is the average fraction of minority students at schools attended by race 
group j in city c, Rjc is the average fraction of minority neighbors of students in group j in 
city c, and μjc is the average of ujsc+ vjnc across all students of race j in city c. 
                                                           
10 We do not include error components that vary by city or by race and city, since these will be absorbed by the 
school × race effects.  In our empirical specification, “minorities” are blacks and Hispanics; we have tested for 
differential effects of exposure to the two groups and fail to reject equality in a wide range of alternative 
specifications.  Tables that report separate effects are available upon request.  10 
  Although averaging eliminates the effects of within-city sorting, there still may be 
differences in the average unobserved “abilities” of students -- or in the average quality of 
the local schools -- that would lead to biases in the estimation of equation (1’) across cities.  
Any differences that are common across race groups in a city can be “differenced out” by 
comparing blacks and whites within the same city.  Specifically, (1’) implies: 
(2) y1c - y2c  =   X1c α1   – X2c α2    + Z1c  β1 – Z2c β2  +  W1c  ν1 – W2c ν2   +   B1cγ1 – B2cγ2   
      +    R1c δ1 – R2c δ2   +   μ1c – μ2c, 
where j=1 represents blacks and j=2 represents whites.  If the coefficients in equation (1) are 
the same for whites and blacks, equation (2) takes a particularly simple form: 
(2’)  Δyc  =    ΔXc α    +   ΔZcβ   +  ΔWc  ν +  ΔBcγ +  ΔRc δ  +  Δμc , 
where Δyc, for example, denotes the difference in mean test scores between blacks and 
whites in the same city.   
 The  differences  ΔBc and  ΔRc in equation (2’) are closely related to standard 
segregation indexes of “exposure” and “isolation.”
11  When schools and neighborhoods are 
fully segregated, B1c = R1c = 1 and B2c = R2c =0, so ΔBc = ΔRc = 1.  When they are 
completely integrated, B1c = B2c and R1c = R2c, so ΔBc = ΔRc = 0.  ΔZc and ΔWc measure 
other differences in the schools and neighborhoods of black and white children, such as the 
gap in average school quality between the schools attended by blacks and whites, or the gap 
in average incomes in the neighborhoods of black and white children. 
  Although differencing eliminates any city-wide factors that affect blacks and whites 
equally, there may be remaining differences in unobserved determinants of achievement 
between the two groups.  We posit that this remaining gap can be decomposed as: 
                                                           
11 In the segregation literature (e.g. Massey and Denton, 1988; Iceland, Weinberg, and Stienmetz, 2002), Bjc and 
Rjc are known as indices of exposure of race-j students to minorities, and ΔBc and ΔRc are similar to isolation 
indices (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor 1999).    11 
(3)  μ1c - μ2c = Fcψ + ηc , 
where Fc is a vector of city characteristics—including measures of the city racial 
composition—and ηc represents all remaining unobserved differences.  This leads to a model 
of the form: 
(4)   Δyc =  ΔXc α    +   ΔZcβ   +  ΔWc  ν +  ΔBcγ +  ΔRc δ  +   Fc ψ  +  ηc . 
OLS estimation of this equation will yield consistent estimates of γ and δ provided that ηc is 
uncorrelated with ΔBc and ΔRc, conditional on the control variables included in (4).  
  A key threat to the identification of the segregation effects in equation (4) is 
differential sorting of black and white families to different metropolitan areas.  For example, if 
achievement-oriented black families migrate to cities where schools or neighborhoods are 
less racially segregated, and if their characteristics are not fully captured in the measured 
student background variables, then ηc may be negatively correlated with ΔBc  and/or ΔRc.  
Our main specifications include a rich set of controls for the observed characteristics of 
black and white students in different cities, including parental education and income, as well 
as various city-level variables.  In Section V, however, we present some robustness checks 
and additional analyses to evaluate the likely biases in these models.   
  Our main analyses simplify equation (4) in two ways.  First, as we noted in Section II, 
it is unrealistic to assume that all the relevant characteristics of schoolmates and neighbors 
can be measured.  We therefore focus on a “reduced form” specification that excludes the W 
and Z variables: 
(5)   Δyc =  ΔXc α’    +   ΔBcγ’ +  ΔRc δ’  +   Fc ψ’  +  ηc , 
where γ’ and δ’ are related to γ and δ by the usual omitted variables formulas.  Thus, γ’ will 
incorporate the direct effects of exposure to minority schoolmates, indirect effects associated 
with the characteristics of the schools and neighborhoods that can be predicted from  12 
knowledge of ΔBc,, conditional on ΔRc, and any “macro” effects of city-wide school 
segregation.  In section V, below, we attempt to estimate the indirect exposure effects that 
derive from school resources and the incomes of schoolmates and neighbors.   
  Second, we present estimates both of equation (5) and of even simpler specifications 
that include only one of the segregation measures at a time.  School and neighborhood 
segregation are highly correlated across cities, making it difficult to distinguish their separate 
effects even when the combined effect is precisely estimated.  When only residential 
segregation is included, for example, the resulting coefficient provides an estimate of δ’+πγ’, 
where π  is the coefficient on ΔR from an auxiliary regression of ΔB on ΔR, ΔX, and F.  
Empirically, π is close to one, so the coefficient is approximately the sum of δ’ and γ’.  
 
d. Taking Advantage of Student-Level Covariates 
  The aggregated model (5) has only as many degrees of freedom as the number of 
metropolitan areas in the sample, limiting the flexibility of our controls for family 
background factors.  To fully exploit our rich microdata, we partial out the student-level 
covariates observed in the SAT files (mother’s education, father’s education, and family 
income), using a highly flexible specification that is fully interacted by race.  We then 
aggregate “residual” SAT scores to the city level, and include sparser parameterizations of 
the ΔX vector in our city-level analysis.  The procedure is described in greater detail in the 
Appendix.  Although the first stage adjustment may not fully eliminate the effect of 
observable student characteristics, we anticipate that the inclusion of ΔXc in the second stage 
model absorbs most of their remaining variation. 
 
e. Adjusting For Selective Participation in the SAT  13 
  A concern with the use of SAT test scores to measure achievement is selective test 
participation.  As discussed below, we restrict our sample to cities in states where a majority 
of college-bound students write the SAT (rather than the alternative ACT test).  Even within 
“SAT states”, however, test participation rates vary.  Presumably, students at “low 
performing” schools are under-represented in the test-taking population, with greater under-
representation in cities with lower overall participation.  Positive selection into participation 
will tend to attenuate any negative effects of segregation on black relative test scores (Gronau, 
1974; Heckman, 1979).
12  We attempt to reduce such biases by re-weighting the average 
scores from different high schools in a city to reflect their relative enrollments, and by 
including a control function in our empirical model based on relative SAT participation rates 
across high schools in a city.  
  These adjustments are derived from a conventional bivariate normal model of test 
participation and test score outcomes (Heckman, 1979).  As shown in the Appendix, such a 
model leads to a specification for the black-white difference in the adjusted, reweighted test 
scores in city c that differs from equation (5) by the addition of two terms: 
(6)  Δrc = ΔX’c α’   +  ΔBcγ’ +  ΔRcδ’  +  Fc ψ’  +  ζ Δλc  + ζ  Δθc  + ηc  + Δec . 
In this equation, ζ is a coefficient that reflects the correlation between the unobserved 
component of the individual test participation equation and the unobserved component of 
the test outcome equation, Δλc is the black-white difference in the enrollment-weighted 
average of the school-specific inverse Mills ratio function (evaluated at the test participation 
rate of black or white students at each high school in the city), and Δθc is an unobserved 
error component that reflects the black-white difference in the degree of within-school 
                                                           
12 The correlation of SAT-taking rates and average scores across schools is positive in our data, which would be 
consistent with negative selection into test-taking.  We strongly suspect that the individual level selection is 
positive, but that large differences in the unobserved determinants of participation rates and mean scores 
dominate the across-school correlation.  14 
selectivity of test-writers.   
If test takers were randomly selected at each high school, but different fractions of 
students wrote the test at different schools, the control function Δλc would fully correct for 
selectivity biases in the observed test scores and Δθc would equal 0.  In general, however, test 
writers are not randomly selected within schools and so the error component Δθc will not 
vanish.  If a rise in school or neighborhood segregation causes black relative test scores to 
fall but also causes a rise in the relative within-school selectivity of black test takers, the 
presence of this term will lead to attenuation in the estimated negative effect of segregation 
on relative test scores. 
 
III.  Data Sources and Sample Overview 
  Our primary source of student achievement data is a sample of SAT records for 
roughly one third of test takers in the 1998-2001 high school graduation classes.
13  These 
data include self-reported family background characteristics as well as high school identifiers, 
which we use to match enrollment from the appropriate editions of the Common Core of 
Data (CCD, for public school students) and the 1997-8 Private School Survey (PSS).  To 
minimize the impact of measurement errors we estimate the number of students, the 
number of test takers, and the racial composition of each school using averages over the 
four years in our data.
14  We assign students to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) based 
on year-2000 definitions, using school location information in the CCD and PSS files.
15   We 
                                                           
13 The sampling rate was 100% for black and Hispanic test-takers and for those from California and Texas, and 
25% for others.  We use sampling weights in all computations of city-level averages.  We exclude observations 
for students who reported ethnicity other than white or black (primarily Hispanics and Asians) and those who 
did not report their race/ethnicity. 
14 This strategy cannot be employed with the PSS, as only one year of data is available. 
15 Where a larger metropolitan area is designated a Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) with 
several sub-areas (Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas, or PMSAs), we treat the PMSA as the relevant city 
definition.  In every specification, however, we estimate standard errors that are “clustered” by CMSA.  15 
restrict our analysis of SAT outcomes to MSAs in states with overall test participation rates 
of 25% or higher, which we refer to as “SAT states.”  
  As described above, we use the SAT microdata to estimate race-specific, within-
school models relating test scores to three key family background variables -- mother’s 
education, father’s education, and income.
16  We then form an enrollment-weighted average 
of the residual scores for black and white students from the high schools in each city.  Our 
primary dependent variable is the black-white difference in this weighted average.   
  Recognizing that SAT scores are influenced not just by the racial composition of a 
student’s 12
th-grade school but also by the composition of her schools in earlier grades, we 
attempt to measure the average exposure of white and black students to minority 
schoolmates throughout their educational careers.  We compute exposure rates for high 
schools in the MSA in 1998-2001 and for elementary schools in 1988-1991, and form an 
average of these that puts two-thirds weight on the latter and one-third on the former.  Our 
school segregation measure is the black-white difference in this lifetime exposure measure.
17   
 We use data on the racial composition and population of Census tracts in 2000 
(from the full population counts, Census 2000 Summary File 1) to construct measures of 
neighborhood-level exposure to black and Hispanic neighbors, and thereby of city-level 
residential segregation.
18  We also use Summary Files computed from 2000 Census long-
form data to estimate the average family background characteristics of black and white 
                                                           
16 These regressions are fit by race, and include unrestricted high school dummies and 114 background 
dummies, formed from the 14 income categories reported in the SAT and the full interaction of the 10 
categories for each parent’s education.   The income and education categories include “missing” as one 
possibility.   
17 When we analyze outcomes that are only available for public schools or for which we cannot readily 
distinguish different grades (e.g. teacher-student ratios), we use point-in-time school segregation measures 
computed over the relevant schools and grade levels. 
18 Census tracts are initially defined to encompass demographically homogenous neighborhoods of about 4,000 
residents, but once drawn generally have stable boundaries.  Exposure measures based on Census Block 
Groups (typically about 1000 residents) are nearly perfectly correlated across cities with the tract-based 
measures and lead to virtually identical estimates.  16 
students in each city, supplementing this with information from the public use samples 
(PUMS) for characteristics (e.g. parental education and residual parental wages) that are not 
tabulated elsewhere.  We also use the PUMS data to construct a measure of the black-white 
gap in degree attainment that that is free from any test participation biases.  Further details 
on our data sources and merging methods are presented in a Data Appendix, available on 
request. 
  Table 1 gives an overview of the patterns of segregation and test scores for a 
selection of cities with different patterns of residential and school segregation.  The first two 
columns show the fraction black and Hispanic in the metropolitan area.
19  Columns C-E 
show the mean exposure of black and white students in each city to minority (black and 
Hispanic) schoolmates, while the final columns show parallel measures of tract-level 
exposure to minority neighbors.   
  The first two panels of the table present data for cities with the lowest and highest 
levels of school segregation, among the subset of all MSA’s in SAT states with at least 5% 
black population shares.  The five lowest segregation cities are all in the South: in these 
cities, the typical black-white gap in exposure to minority schoolmates (ΔBc) is about 6%. In 
three of the cities the gap in exposure to minority neighbors (ΔRc) is comparable, but in two 
cities (Wilmington, North Carolina and Gainesville, Florida) neighborhoods are substantially 
more segregated.  Among the 5 most-segregated cities, 4 are in the mid-Atlantic region: all 
have highly segregated neighborhoods as well as schools.
20 
  We can only identify separate effects of school and neighborhood segregation to the 
extent that the two vary independently.  The two bottom panels of Table 1 present data for 
                                                           
19 We treat Hispanics as a distinct racial category, excluding them from both the white and black groups.  In 
2000 Census data, where possible we include multi-race non-Hispanics as blacks if they report black as one of 
their races; we never count multi-race individuals as white. 
20 Some of the most highly segregated cities in the U.S., like Detroit and Chicago, are in states where a majority 
of students write the ACT.  These cities are excluded from Table 1 and from all of our SAT analyses.  17 
the cities with the biggest divergence between the two measures, first for cities with relatively  
integrated schools and then for cities with relatively segregated schools.
21  The degree of 
neighborhood segregation is similar in the two groups of cities but the extent of school 
segregation is much smaller in the first group (mean exposure gap=13%) than in the second 
(mean exposure gap=49%).  Although residential and school segregation are highly 
correlated, there is clearly substantial independent variation in the two factors. 
  Table 2 presents some comparisons between the students in all 331 MSA’s in the 
country (columns A-B), those in the 189 cities from SAT states that are included in our 
analysis sample (columns C-D), and those in the 142 cities that are excluded from our test 
score samples (columns E-F).  On average 43 percent of white high school students and 31 
percent of black high school students from cities in the SAT states write the SAT.  Blacks 
are slightly under-represented in the SAT state cities whereas Hispanics are over-
represented.
22  Cities from SAT states also have slightly less segregated neighborhoods and 
schools than cities in other states.   
  The bottom two rows in Table 2 show average SAT scores for the different city 
groups and the mean test gap between whites and blacks.  Average SAT scores are lower in 
high-participation states (Dynarski, 1987; Rothstein, forthcoming), but the black-white 
difference is very similar for cities in SAT and non-SAT states, suggesting that use of within-
city differences reduces problems associated with selective test participation. 
  As a final descriptive exercise, Figures 1-3 show the correlations across cities 
between the black-white adjusted test score gap and the relative segregation of 
neighborhoods (Figure 1), the relative segregation of schools (Figure 2), and the part of the 
                                                           
21 We define the degree of divergence as the residual from a regression of school segregation (ΔBc) on 
neighborhood segregation (ΔRc). 
22 California, Texas, and Florida are all SAT states.  In Table 2 (and in the remainder of our analysis), cities are 
weighted by (1/Nbc + 1/Nwc)-1 where Nbc and Nwc are the numbers of blacks and whites in the city population.  
Cities with very few blacks thus receive very low weights.  18 
relative segregation of schools that is orthogonal to the relative segregation of 
neighborhoods (Figure 3). There is a strong negative relationship in the first two graphs 
between each racial segregation measure and the relative test scores of black students.
 23 The 
relationship is weaker when we focus on the component of school segregation that is 
orthogonal to neighborhood segregation, and seems to be driven more heavily by a few 
outliers.  As we document below, this relationship disappears entirely as we add control 
variables, though the relationship between residential segregation and black relative test 
scores remains strong. 
 
IV.  Regression Models for Black-White Gaps in Participation and Scores 
a.  Basic Models 
  Table 3 presents an initial set of estimates of the model given by equation (6).  The 
upper panel summarizes models for the black-white gap in adjusted SAT scores, while the 
lower panel shows a parallel set of models that have the gap in SAT participation as the 
dependent variable.  All the models include main effects for the overall fraction black and 
Hispanic in the city’s schools, dummies for 5 census divisions, and (in the upper panel only) 
the black-white gap in a Mill’s ratio formed from the race-specific SAT participation rates in 
the city.
24   We present three sets of specifications: models with only school segregation in 
columns A-C; models with only neighborhood segregation in columns D-F; and models with 
both segregation variables in columns G-I. 
  The most parsimonious models, in columns A and D, show strong negative effects 
                                                           
23 The SAT-state MSA with the most segregated schools is Gary, Indiana.  Newark, New Jersey is second.  
Graphs using the black-white gaps in unadjusted scores look very similar to Figures 1-3.  
24 Although there are nine Census divisions, only six are represented among SAT states.  In Table 3 and the 
remainder of the paper, we exclude cities (4 of 189 in SAT states) for which we cannot construct black-white 
differences in family background characteristics, introduced in Column C, using the 2000 Census microdata 
sample.  19 
of racial segregation (measured across schools or neighborhoods) on average SAT scores 
and on SAT participation.  The -125 coefficient in the model for SAT scores in column A, 
for example, implies that moving from complete segregation to complete integration would 
raise black relative SAT scores by 125 points, or about 60 percent of the overall black-white 
gap.
25  The -0.13 coefficient in the corresponding model for SAT participation suggests that 
a shift from complete segregation to full integration would raise the city-wide relative black 
participation rate by 13 percentage points.   
  The models in columns B and E add controls for a vector of MSA characteristics 
(the log of population, the log of land area, the fractions of residents with 13-15 and 16+ 
years of education, log mean household income, and the Gini coefficient of household 
income) and for black-white gaps in observed characteristics (parental education and family 
income) among SAT-takers in the MSA.
26  These additions reduce the size of the estimated 
segregation effect on test scores, but raise the size of the effect on participation.  Finally, the 
most general specifications in columns C and F add controls for the black-white differences 
in several additional family characteristics (parental education, family income, child poverty, 
single-parenthood, and maternal employment), measured from 2000 Census data.  These 
models also include controls for the mean difference in residual wages between black and 
white parents, computed separately for men and women.
   The motivation for including 
these wage gap measures is discussed in Section IV.  In these specifications the effects of 
segregation on SAT scores are reduced somewhat, but remain statistically significant.  The 
effects on SAT participation are also reduced and are no longer significant. 
                                                           
25 The standard deviation of combined SAT scores is about 200, so the black-white gap is approximately one 
standard deviation, similar (in effect size) to the gap measured in the NAEP at ages 9, 13, or 17 (Perie, Morand, 
and Lutkus, 2005).  
26 For the analysis of SAT participation we do not control for the relative characteristics of SAT takers, since 
the population at risk includes all students in a city.    20 
  The models in columns G-I of Table 3 include both segregation measures 
simultaneously.  In the sparsest specification (G), school segregation appears to have the 
larger effect.  When we add controls for metropolitan and SAT-taker characteristics, 
however, the school segregation coefficient falls to near zero and the residential segregation 
coefficient becomes large and negative.  The sum of the two coefficients is quite close to the 
residential segregation effect in the corresponding models in Columns D-F.  We can reject 
that the neighborhood segregation effect is zero, but not (in column I) that the two forms of 
segregation have equal effects.  Similar patterns are seen in the participation models:  
Residential segregation appears to reduce relative black participation while school 
segregation tends to increase it, and here we can reject equal effects.  Overall, it seems that 
residential segregation matters, but controlling for this, differences in relative exposure to 
minority schoolmates have little effect on black relative achievement.  Taking the coefficient 
on residential segregation in column F of Table 3 as a benchmark, the implied effect of 
moving from a highly segregated city (Gary Indiana, ΔRc=0.70) to a nearly unsegregated city 
(Fort Walton Beach Florida, ΔRc=0.06) is a 45 point closing in the black-white SAT gap (or 
roughly a 0.22 “effect size”).
27 
  We have estimated many alternative specifications to probe the robustness of this 
conclusion.  Some of these alternative models are presented in Appendix Table 1.  In one 
check, we include a dummy variable for cities from the three states with high fractions of 
Hispanic immigrants – California, Florida, and Texas.  This has no effect on the pattern of 
results seen in Table 3.  In a second check, we compared the effects of alternative school 
segregation measures.  When only elementary school segregation for our cohort of test 
                                                           
27 The -70 coefficient implies a 70/200 =0.35 standard deviation effect of a one-unit decrease in minority share 
in the neighborhood.   This implies that the -7 percentage point treatment effect on minority exposure in the 
MTO experiment should have yielded a 0.025 standard deviation effect on test scores.    The estimated 
treatment effect on math scores (Sanbonmatsu et et., 2006, Table 4, row 1, column 5) was 0.018 (s.e.  0.03).  21 
takers is included, it has a coefficient of -19 (standard error 20) – very similar to the 
coefficient estimate for the “lifetime” segregation average in column I of Table 3.  When we 
try to include separate effects for elementary and school segregation their coefficients are of 
opposite signs (elementary segregation negative, high school segregation positive, 
individually and jointly significant) but the sum is small and positive, while the effect of 
residential segregation remains large and negative.  
Finally, we estimated models that allow the effects of minority exposure to differ for 
black and white students.  Specifically, we allowed black students’ exposure to minority 
neighbors to have separate effects on black and white test scores, and similarly allowed white 
students’ exposure rates to affect both groups.   Consistent with the “differenced” functional 
form used in Table 3, these models (reported in columns E-G of Appendix Table 1) indicate 
that black exposure to minority neighbors reduces black students’ test scores but has little 
effect on whites, while the reverse is true for white exposure to minorities.
28  We cannot 
reject the assumption that exposure to minority neighbors has a similar negative effect on 
both blacks and whites, and that neighborhood segregation therefore widens the black-white 
test score gap. 
 
d.  Selection into SAT-taking 
A potential concern with the results so far is that we may not have fully controlled 
for selective SAT participation.  To probe the robustness of our results, Columns H and I of 
Appendix Table 1 present estimates of our basic specifications that omit the Mill’s ratio 
control function and ignore the re-weighting adjustment for differential high school level 
participation within a given city.  These simpler unadjusted models show a significant but 
                                                           
28 These models dispense with the unrestricted MSA fixed effect that is implicit in our differenced models.  The 
absence of cross-race effects suggests that any MSA effects are uncorrelated with racial composition.  22 
slightly smaller effect of residential segregation on relative test scores, but no effect of school 
segregation once the residential measure is included.
29  The fact that the unadjusted models 
show smaller effects is consistent with the predicted pattern of selectivity biases, under the 
assumption that higher scoring students are more likely to write the test in all cities.  
Arguably, any remaining selection problems in our adjusted models have a similar effect, 
implying that the results in Table 3 understate the true effects of segregation. 
A second and perhaps more persuasive way to evaluate the impact of selective test 
participation is to examine models for black-white relative attainment based on outcomes for 
a random sample of youths.
  We used the 2000 Census 5-percent micro samples to estimate 
the fraction of 16-24 year olds in each city who either are currently enrolled in school or 
have completed high school.
30   We then constructed the black-white gap in this outcome 
and related it to our city control variables and the segregation measures.  
  The resulting estimates are presented in Table 4, using a sample of 234 MSA’s with 
at least 50 students of each race in the 5 percent Census samples.  The specifications in 
columns A-E include only neighborhood segregation, while the models in columns F-J 
include both segregation measures.  The specifications are similar to those in Table 3, with a 
few exceptions:  the Mills ratio term is excluded; the SAT-taker background characteristics 
(introduced in columns B, E, and H of Table 3) are omitted; and the Census-based measures 
of black-white gaps in observable characteristics (introduced in columns C, F, and I of Table 
3) are introduced in three stages, with just the parental education measures included in 
                                                           
29 We have also explored other types of selection corrections, including artificially trimming the data to retain 
the same fraction of the high school population in each city.  Our basic results of large negative effects of 
residential segregation and essentially zero effects of non-residential segregation have held up in every 
specification. 
30 To insulate against bias from endogenous mobility of young people who have left their parents’ homes, we 
assign individuals to the MSA where they lived in 1995, when they were aged 11-19.  A limitation of the Census 
data is that there is no family background information for children who are no longer living with their parents.  
Consequently, we make no individual-level adjustments for family background.    23 
Columns C and H of Table 4, the remaining measures except for wage differences added in 
Columns D and I, and the parental wage measures added in E and J.   
  The simplest models in columns A-C suggest that there is a significant negative 
effect of neighborhood segregation on black youths’ relative education outcomes.   These 
findings are similar in spirit, though smaller in magnitude, to results reported by Cutler and 
Glaeser (1997), whose models include fewer controls.
31  The corresponding models in 
columns F-H suggest that once neighborhood segregation is taken into account, there is little 
or no additional effect of school segregation.  Although imprecise, these estimates show the 
same pattern as our findings for test scores, suggesting that selective SAT participation is not 
the driving our main results. 
  Nevertheless, examination of the richest specifications in Table 4 (columns D-E and 
I-J suggests that inferences about the effects of segregation on educational attainment are 
sensitive to the set of background control variables.  In particular, once the full set of relative 
background variables we use in Table 3 are added, the estimated impacts of school 
segregation on its own, or of school and neighborhood segregation taken together, fall in 
magnitude and become insignificant.  By contrast, the models in Table 3 show robust 
negative effects of relative exposure to minority neighbors on black-white relative test 
scores.  One potential explanation for the difference is that neighborhood segregation has 
smaller effects on basic achievement outcomes (like completing high school) than on higher-
level achievement outcomes (like college entry test scores).  Unfortunately, however, the 
Census outcome models have limited power against reasonable effect sizes, so it is difficult 
                                                           
31 Cutler and Glaeser (1997) use a 1% sample of the 1990 Census, and relate black relative high school 
graduation rates (and other outcomes) to a residential segregation measure.  Their models only control for 4 
city-wide variables: log population, the fraction of blacks in the city, log median income, and manufacturing 
share of employment.  Their estimates imply that moving from complete segregation to complete integration 
would raise relative high school graduation rates of black 20-24 year olds by 30 percentage points.  This is 
enormous:  Even in highly segregated cities in their sample the black graduation rate is 74%.  24 
to reach definitive conclusions.   
    
V.  Confounding Influences 
  Our reading of the results in Tables 3 and 4 is that there is a relatively strong 
relationship between segregation and the black-white achievement gap, and that this 
relationship cannot be attributed to selective test participation.  More tentatively, the link 
appears to run through neighborhoods rather than schools.  In this section we address two 
key questions: (1) Is the effect of neighborhood segregation on relative achievement 
overstated because of omitted variables biases?  (2) Is the effect of school segregation on 
relative achievement understated? 
 
a. Is the Effect of Neighborhood Segregation Overstated? 
  The most obvious source of concern with the results in Table 3 is that there are 
unobserved differences in the latent abilities of black and white students in different cities 
that are correlated with the degree of segregation in the city.  Although the test score gap is 
computed from “residual” test scores that control very flexibly for the observed parental 
education of SAT test takers, and our models control for black-white differences in parental 
characteristics of the SAT takers in each city as well as differences in family characteristics 
observed in the Census, it is still possible that unobserved ability gaps remain.   
Recent work (e.g., Heckman and Carneiro, 2003; Cunha et. al, 2005) has shown that 
the academic achievement of children is strongly correlated with the cognitive ability of their 
parents, and that cognitive ability is a key determinant of earnings. This research suggests 
that a useful proxy for the unobserved ability of a child (conditional on parental education) is 
the unexplained component of his or her parent’s earnings.  Building on this idea, we fit a  25 
standard wage determination model separately by race and gender, and constructed estimates 
of the mean residual wage gaps between black and white mothers and fathers in each city.
32  
The models reported in the final columns of Tables 3 and 4 include these residual wage gaps 
as additional controls.  Their inclusion has essentially no impact on the estimated segregation 
effects, suggesting that differences in the unobserved cognitive abilities of black and white 
parents in different cities are not biasing our main results. 
  Despite this, the potential for endogeneity bias merits further consideration.  There 
are two reasons why unobserved differences in the family backgrounds of black and white 
children could be correlated with the degree of segregation in a city.  One is that the degree 
of residential segregation varies endogenously with the characteristics of the local 
population. The other is that people selectively move to a city (or move out) in response to 
the patterns of segregation, yielding an endogenously selected population.  We suspect that 
the first mechanism is less important than the second, as residential segregation patterns are 
highly stable over time.  Table 5A, for example, presents cross-city correlations between 
various measures of residential segregation in 2000, 1990, 1980, 1970, and 1960.  For 2000 
we use two indexes of segregation: our own relative exposure index (ΔRc) and the so-called 
isolation index constructed by Glaeser and Vigdor (2001).  For earlier years we show the 
correlations with isolation indexes constructed from Census tabulations by Cutler, Glaeser, 
and Vigdor (1999).  Over any 20 year interval the correlation of residential segregation 
measures across cities is 0.8 or higher.
33 
                                                           
32 Specifically, we used the 2000 Census 5% sample to identify adults with resident children age 18 or under.  
For each person we constructed an hourly wage (based on earnings and hours last year), and then regressed 
wages on MSA fixed effects, years of education, indicators for high school dropout and college graduation, and 
a cubic in potential experience, separately by race and gender.  The MSA fixed effect is the mean residual wage 
for the race/gender group in that city. 
33 It is possible, of course, that segregation depends on the unobserved ability gap in the city at some point far 
in the past.  We expect that any correlation between current segregation and historical ability gaps is absorbed 
by our controls for observed characteristics of current students’ parents.  26 
  A more serious concern is the selective mobility of higher and lower ability black and 
white families across cities with differing levels of segregation.  To quantify the potential 
impact of selective mobility, we examined changes in the distribution of high- and low-skill 
black and white families across cities over the 30 year period for which we could assemble 
appropriate data.  We divided black and white adults in each census year, 1970 through 2000, 
into “high”, “medium” and “low” education groups, choosing the cutoffs to keep the shares 
of each group approximately constant over time.  We then calculated the mean segregation 
index experienced by each race/education group in each year, using the 2000 value of 
residential segregation for their city of residence as the measure of segregation.  (The choice 
of a fixed base year for the segregation measure means that changes over time are driven 
solely by changes in the distribution of the group across cities).    
  The left-hand panels in Figure 4 show the mean values of the segregation index for 
each education group in 1980, 1990, and 2000, with blacks in the top row, whites in the 
middle row, and the black-white difference in the bottom row.  These figures show that both 
blacks and whites shifted steadily toward less segregated cities between 1970 and 2000.  The 
shift was more prominent for high-education blacks, consistent with a pattern of 
endogenous mobility that could lead to bias in our sparsest achievement models. 
  The second and third columns in Figure 4 show similar graphs for residual residential 
segregation, after controlling for census division and racial composition effects (second 
column) and the full set of control variables used in our main specifications (third column).  
Simply controlling for geographic region eliminates about half of the differential mobility of 
low- and high-skill blacks, and it is almost entirely eliminated by the addition of the 
remaining control variables.  To the extent that mobility differences by observed education 
are informative about the relationship with unobserved ability, these graphs suggest that  27 
endogenous mobility might introduce bias in extremely sparse models but should not be a 
problem for our main estimates. 
  In sum, based on the observed mobility patterns of different education groups of 
whites versus blacks, the stability of residential segregation within cities over time, and the 
results from our investigation of residual wage gaps, we believe it is unlikely that the 
residential segregation effects in Table 3 are significantly biased by omitted ability factors.  
 
b. Is the Effect of School Segregation Understated? 
We turn now to the second question raised by the results in Table 3:  Are the effects 
of school segregation understated?  An obvious concern is measurement error.  If school 
segregation is poorly measured, or highly variable over time, then the measures we have 
constructed may be unreliable, leading to attenuation biases.  Attenuation would be 
particularly severe in models that include residential segregation, as the two are so highly 
correlated.  To assess the reliability of school segregation, we constructed a number of 
independent measures for U.S. cities over a ten year period, and correlated them with our 
primary index.  One limitation is that we have data on private schools only for 1997-98.  The 
segregation measures for earlier years thus include only public schools.   
The results are summarized in Table 5B.  The first column and row pertain to our 
primary index, which includes public and private school students and is constructed to 
approximate the school career of our test cohorts.  The second variable included is an 
analogous index computed only over public school students, which is nearly perfectly 
correlated across cities with our primary index.  The remaining variables separate out public 
elementary and secondary-level segregation, for both 1988-1991 and 1998-2001.  The raw 
correlations among variables are extremely high, never below 0.94.  28 
The lower panel of Table 5B reports correlations for residuals from regressions of 
school segregation measures on our full vector of control variables (including residential 
segregation).  The correlations remain quite high even for these residuals, at least 0.64 and 
mostly above 0.75.  This compares favorably with the reliability of other commonly used 
constructs, and leads us to conclude that measurement error attenuation is not a serious 
concern with our school segregation measures. 
Nevertheless, as a final check, we present an instrumental variables analysis that 
isolates the component of school segregation that is attributable to court-ordered school 
desegregation programs implemented in the 1970s and early 1980s in many U.S. cities.  The 
instrument is based on Welch and Light’s (1987) estimate of the change in the “dissimilarity 
index”—an alternative index of racial segregation—for the schools in the main school 
district in an MSA, from the year prior to the city’s major desegregation plan to the last year 
of implementation of the order.
34  Welch and Light (1987) only collected data for larger 
school districts, which typically serve the central city of the MSA.  We multiply the change in 
dissimilarity in this district by its share of metropolitan enrollment.  Thus, the instrument 
reflects both the “bite” of the main desegregation plan and the size of the desegregated 
district relative to the overall MSA.   
Table 6 presents the IV analysis.  Given the small sample size for which the 
instrument is available, we adopt a parsimonious model similar to the one in column H of 
Table 3 (though with slightly less flexible controls for SAT-takers’ background 
characteristics).  OLS estimates in Column A are quite similar to those from our full sample, 
though less precise.  Column B shows the first stage estimate:  Even after two decades or 
                                                           
34 This variable is set to zero for MSAs containing districts in the Welch and Light sample without a major 
desegregation plan.  Our sample for the IV analyses thus consists of only 60 MSAs that are both in SAT states 
and in the Welch and Light sample.  29 
more the court orders continue to have sizable effects on observed measures of school 
segregation.  Finally, column C shows the IV estimate.  This is relatively imprecise, but gives 
no indication that the OLS estimate is biased in such a way as to mask an underlying 
negative effect of school segregation. 
 
V.  Within School Segregation?   
One potential explanation for our finding that school segregation has little or no 
effect on relative achievement is that in cities with highly segregated neighborhoods, school 
integration efforts are offset by programs and behaviors that lead to within school segregation 
(Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor, 2003;  Clotfelter, 2004; Eyler, Cook, and Ward, 1983).
35  As a 
proxy for within-school exposure, we use data on course enrollment patterns from the SAT 
data set.  SAT-takers are asked whether they have taken honors courses and whether they 
intend to claim advanced placement (AP) credit or course exemptions in college on the basis 
of high school work.  Column A of Table 7 presents models for the fraction of students in a 
city who intend to claim college-level credit in any subject, while Columns B through D 
present models for the fraction of students who indicated that they had taken honors 
courses in math, English, or any subject, respectively. 
In Panels A and B we present estimates of the relationships between the school and 
neighborhood segregation measures and the black and white means of the course-taking 
variables.  The estimates in Panel A show no significant relationship between either school 
                                                           
35 Anecdotal evidence suggests that districts often create special programs to attract white students to high-
minority schools or, alternatively, to avoid truly desegregating their school systems in the face of judicial 
oversight.  As an example of the latter, the federal district court judge’s opinion in People Who Care v. Rockford 
Board of Education, 851 F. Supp. 905 (1993) states: “The court finds that the ability grouping and tracking 
practices of the Rockford School District (hereinafter ‘RSD’) did not represent a trustworthy enactment of any 
academically acceptable theory or practice. The RSD tracking practices skewed enrollment in favor of whites 
and to the disadvantage of minority students. The court finds that it was the policy of the RSD to use tracking 
to intentionally segregate white students from minority students….” (p. 940)  30 
or neighborhood segregation and black course-taking.  The estimates in Panel B, by 
comparison, show relatively strong negative impacts of school segregation on honors and 
AP participation by whites, many of which are at the margin of significance.   To interpret 
these impacts, note that a rise in our segregation index implies that whites are relatively less 
exposed to minorities.  Thus, a negative coefficient means that white students are more likely 
to take honors and AP classes in cities with more integrated schools and neighborhoods.  
Finally, Panel C reports estimates for the black-white difference in honors participation at 
the city level.  Increased school segregation is associated with large positive effects on the 
black-white gap in honors course taking and in AP participation.  Increases in neighborhood 
segregation have negative effects, although the coefficients are mostly smaller and uniformly 
insignificant.   
Though participation rates in honors and AP courses are limited measures of within-
school exposure, the results in Table 7 support the hypothesis that across-school integration 
is associated with within-school segregation   Holding constant neighborhood segregation, 
white students are more likely to participate in “high track” courses when schools are more 
integrated, presumably limiting the classroom-level exposure of blacks to whites.
36  To the 
extent that school peer effects operate through classroom-level exposure, then, our school 
segregation measure may have relatively little signal for the relevant peer group. 
 
VI.  Indirect Effects of School Quality and Peer Characteristics 
All of our specifications so far have excluded any characteristics of the schools and 
neighborhoods of black and white students other than their minority composition.  As noted 
                                                           
36 We have also estimated models for the tracking measures that separate out the components of school 
segregation attributable to court-ordered desegregation.  Standard errors are large, but the results indicate that, 
if anything, court-ordered desegregation has larger effects on tracking than does the residual component.    31 
in the discussion of equation (5), our coefficient estimates capture direct minority exposure 
effects as well as any indirect effects associated with relative resources, peer characteristics, 
or macro segregation effects that can be predicted by the relative exposure of black and 
white students to minority schoolmates and neighbors.  As a final step in our analysis we 
explore the potential contributions of two types of indirect effects: those arising from 
differences in school quality, and those arising from the relative incomes of schoolmates and 
neighbors.   
 
a.  Relative School Quality 
Unfortunately, there are few measures of school quality available at the national level 
for broad samples of schools.   We focus on a limited set of school resource measures (from 
the Common Core of Data, or CCD) and teacher quality measures (from the Schools and 
Staffing Survey, or SASS).  Since the magnitude of any indirect effect of school resources 
depends on the extent to which differences in the resources at schools attended by black and 
white students in a city are correlated with ΔBc and ΔRc ,  we begin by presenting a series of 
models  for the city-wide “quality gaps” between black and white students’ schools, with the 
same explanatory variables included in our models for the black-white test score gap in Table 
3.  These models are presented in Table 8. 
In Column A, we examine the number of full-time-equivalent teachers per student at 
public schools attended by white and black students in each MSA.  Column B reports 
estimates for expenditures per pupil in districts enrolling white and black students.
37  Black-
white gaps in these two measures are essentially unrelated to the degree of school or 
                                                           
37 District-level spending per capita data are available from the CCD Local Education Agency Finance Survey 
(also known as the F-33 portion of the Census of Governments).  Unfortunately, this is an imperfect measure 
of the actual spending at black and white students’ schools if spending varies across schools in each district.    32 
neighborhood segregation in a city.  
Columns C-F report similar models for the black-white gap in average teacher 
characteristics, estimated from the SASS.  Models for the gaps in average salaries and 
experience between the teachers at black and white students’ schools (columns C and D) are 
noisy but show no significant segregation effects.  The model in column E shows that 
neighborhood segregation is associated with fewer teachers who have undergraduate degrees 
in education at black students’ schools relative to those attended by white students.  
Assuming that the fraction of teachers with an education major is a negative quality 
indicator, this could mean that part of our estimated segregation effects on test scores reflect 
indirect effects of teacher credentials, though we suspect any such effect is small.  Finally, 
column F shows that black students have a substantially lower relative fraction of white 
teachers in cities with greater school segregation.  Interestingly, there is no corresponding 
effect of neighborhood segregation.   
We have also estimated variants of the models in Table 3 that included the school 
quality measures directly.  As is well known from the omitted variables formula, there is a 
direct connection between the coefficient estimates in Table 8 and the difference in the 
estimated effects of segregation with and without controls for school quality gaps.
38  
Consistent with the findings in Table 8, the estimated segregation effects on test scores are 
invariant to inclusion of any of the available measures, either alone or in combination. 
  
b. Schoolmate and Neighborhood Income 
Differences in the average characteristics of schoolmates and neighbors of black and 
                                                           
38  Unfortunately, as the SASS samples relatively few teachers in each MSA, the teacher quality measures are 
quite noisy.  This attenuates their estimated effects on test scores and reduces the impact of their inclusion on 
the segregation coefficients.   By contrast, measurement error in the resource variables would not bias the 
estimates in Table 8.  33 
white students may also contribute to indirect exposure effects.  To provide some evidence 
on the potential magnitudes, we used data from the CCD to estimate the black-white gap in 
average exposure to schoolmates receiving free school lunches (a common though imperfect 
proxy for low income) and data from the Census to compute the black-white gap in average 
neighborhood income.   
Columns A and B of Table 9 present models in which we regress these measures on 
our racial segregation measures.  As shown in column A, the black-white gap in exposure to 
schoolmates receiving free lunches is positively related to the relative segregation of the 
schools in a city, but negatively related to the degree of neighborhood segregation.  Thus, 
any negative effect of schoolmate poverty on test scores should contribute negatively to the 
estimated effect of school segregation but positively to the estimated effect of residential 
segregation.  The model in column B shows that the black-white gap in mean neighborhood 
income is negatively related to neighborhood segregation (but uncorrelated with school 
segregation).  Any positive effect of neighborhood income on student achievement should 
therefore contribute negatively to the estimated residential segregation effect.  
Columns C, D, and E present models that assess these conjectures directly, by 
adding the school lunch and neighborhood income measures to the specification shown in 
column I of Table 3.   Consistent with the pattern of results in Table 3, differential exposure 
to low-income schoolmates—at least using an admittedly limited proxy based on school lunch 
participation—has little effect on relative black test scores, while differential exposure to 
low-income neighbors seems to reduce black performance.  After controlling for the indirect 
effect associated with neighborhood income, the estimated effect of exposure to minority 
neighbors remains negative but is reduced by about one-half and is no longer statistically 
insignificant.  These estimates suggest that an important share of the neighborhood  34 
segregation effect measured in our main specifications can be explained as an indirect effect 
of exposure to low income neighbors (Wilson, 1987), rather than as a direct minority 
exposure effect. 
 
VII.  Summary and Conclusions 
  In this paper we present new evidence on the effects of racial segregation on the 
relative achievement of black students.  Building from a model in which the racial 
composition of school and neighborhood peer groups exerts both direct and indirect causal 
effects on student achievement, we show that the black-white achievement gap in a city will 
vary with the relative segregation of schools and neighborhoods in the city.    
  Our main empirical evidence is based on SAT outcomes for one third of test takers 
in the 1998-2001 test cohorts.   We match test-takers to information on the racial 
composition of their high schools and to an extensive set of family background 
characteristics of black and white students in their cities.  To address concerns about 
potential selectivity biases in the SAT outcomes, we also use 2000 Census data to construct 
measures of the relative achievement of black and white youth in different metropolitan 
areas. 
  When we focus on one type of segregation at a time, both school and neighborhood 
segregation appear to have negative effects on black relative test scores and educational 
attainment.  In models that include both school and neighborhood segregation, however, the 
effects of relative exposure to black and Hispanic schoolmates are uniformly small and 
statistically insignificant, whereas the effects of relative exposure to black and Hispanic 
neighbors are negative.  Probes into possible explanations for the absence of school 
segregation effects, including instrumental variables estimates based on court ordered  35 
desegregation programs, give no indication that our estimates are biased in a way that would 
obscure negative effects of school segregation.   
  Taken as a whole, our results indicate that segregation matters for black relative 
achievement.  The precise channels for these effects remains open, although our tentative 
conclusion is that the neighborhood composition matters more than school composition.  
Moreover, an important share of the neighborhood segregation effect may be an indirect 
effect deriving from the strong correlation between a neighborhood’s minority composition 
and its mean income.    
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Appendix 
 
A. Taking Advantage of Student-Level Covariates 
  To fully exploit our rich microdata, we partial out the student-level covariates 
observed in the SAT files (mother’s education, father’s education, and family income) before 
aggregating to the city level.  We estimate separate student-level models for white and black 
test takers that each include unrestricted school effects and a highly flexible specification for 
these covariates: 
 Y ijsc = ζjsc + fj(Xijsc) + εijsc. 
We then form an adjusted test score for each student: 
 r ijsc  =  Yijsc -  fˆ
j(Xijsc),  
and consider a city-level model for the difference in mean adjusted test scores: 
(A1)   r1c - r2c  =  ΔX’c α’   +  ΔBcγ’ +  ΔRcδ’  +   Fc ψ’  +  vc +  e1c - e2c , 
where ejc = fjc -  fˆ
jc , fjc represents the mean of fj(Xijsc) for students of race j in city c,  fˆ
jc 
represents its estimated counterpart; and ΔX’c includes black-white differences in a limited 
selection of background variables (including  fˆ , several of its individual arguments, and 
additional measures that are available from Census data).   Although the first stage 
adjustment may not fully eliminate the effect of observable student characteristics, we 
anticipate that the inclusion of ΔX’c in the second stage model absorbs most of the 
remaining variation in Δec. 
 
B. Derivation of Selection-Corrected Estimation Model 
 
  Assume that the probability that student i in race group j in school s in city c writes 
the SAT is given by a latent index model of the form: 
(B1)  P(i writes test|  Xijsc;  s,j,c) = pijsc  =  P(  Xijsc πj  +  μijsc   ≥  kjsc ) ,   ii 
where μijsc is an error component and kjsc is a school and group-specific threshold.  Assuming 
that μijsc and the error εijsc in the test score outcome model (equation 1) are jointly normally 
distributed, with a distribution that is constant across schools (but may vary by race) the 
expected test score for student i in group j in school s, conditional on writing the test, is  
(B2) E[  yijsc |i writes test, Xijsc; s,j,c ] = Xijscαj  +  Zsc βj   +  Wijsc νj    
                                                 +   Bsc γj   +  Rijsc δj  +  ujsc  +  ζj λ(pijsc) , 
where λ(p) is the inverse Mills ratio function evaluated at  Φ
−1(p) and ζj is a race-specific 
coefficient that depends on the correlation of μijsc and εijsc.  The adjusted observed test score 
for individual i is therefore: 
(B3)   rijsc  =    X’ijsc αj   + Zsc βj   +  Wijsc νj   +   Bsc γj   +  Rijsc δj  +   ujsc +  ζj λ(pijsc) +  eijsc, 
where eijsc combines the estimation error in  fˆ
j and the deviation of yijsc from its conditional 
expectation.   
A simple average of the observed test scores in a city will contain a participation-
weighted average of the school effects ujsc’s that differs from the unconditional mean ujc. The 
first step in our adjustment procedure is therefore to reweight the data to obtain an 
enrollment-weighted average of the observed residual test scores for black and white 
students.    
 r jc   =  1/Njc  Σs  Nisc rjsc  =  1/Njc Σs Njsc/Mjsc Σi rijsc  = 1/Njc  Σs Σi pjsc
-1  rijsc  , 
where Njc is the total number of 12
th graders of group j in city c,  Njsc is the number of 12
th 
graders in school s, Mjsc is the number of test-takers in group j in school s, and pjsc =Mjsc/Njsc 
is the test participation rate of group j in school s.  Equation (B3) implies that: 
(B4) rjc  =  X’jc αj + Zjc βj   +  Wjc νj   +   Bjc γj   +  Rjc δj  +     ujc   +  
                  ζj (1/Njc) Σ s Σ i pjsc
-1 λ(pijsc) +  ejc ,  iii 
where  Zjc , Wjc ,  Rjc , Bjc  and ujc are the same as in equation (2) of the main text.  
  Next, consider a first order expansion of the selection-correction function for 
individual i around pjsc, the test participation rate for students of group j in school s: 
   λ(pijsc)  =  λ(pjsc)  +  (pijsc  - pjsc) λ’(pjsc)  +  ξijsc . 
For a range of probabilities between 0.2 and 0.8 the function λ(p) is approximately linear and 
the error ξijsc is small.  Using this expansion: 
     (1/Njc) Σ s Σ i pjsc
-1 λ(pijsc) =  (1/Njc) Σ s Σ i pjsc
-1   { λ(pjsc) + (pijsc  - pjsc) λ’(pjsc)  +  ξijsc  } 
                           =  λjc  + θjc  +  ξjc , 
where  
  λjc   =  (1/Njc) Σ s Σ i pjsc
-1   λ(pjsc) , 
  ξjc     =  (1/Njc) Σ s Σ i pjsc
-1  ξijsc  , 
   θjc   =  (1/Njc) Σ s  Njsc  λ’(pjsc)  (1/Njsc) Σ i  (pijsc  - pjsc)   
          =  (1/Njc) Σ s  Njsc  λ’(pjsc)  {p
T
jsc   - pjsc },    
and p
T
jsc is the average test participation probability among the test writers of group j in school s.  
Note that the first term, λjc, is just an enrollment-weighted average of the inverse Mills ratio 
functions evaluated at the (race-specific) test participation rates at each school.  The second 
term, ξjc, is an average approximation error, which we expect to be small.  The third term, θjc, 
is more problematic.  This term measures the degree of “within-school” selectivity of test-
takers.  It disappears if test participation is random within a school, but is strictly positive 
otherwise.  
  Combining these results with equation (B4), an approximate expression for the 
average adjusted test score for group j in city c is:  
(B5) rjc  =   X’jc αj + Zjc βj   +  Wjc νj   +   Bjc γj   +  Rjc δj  +   ujc  +   ζj λjc  +   ζj θjc  +  ejc . 
Differencing between blacks and whites in the same city and substituting equation (3) from  iv 
the main text for the difference in the unobserved ability components leads to: 
(B6)  Δrc = r1c - r2c  = X’1c α1   – X’2c α2    + Z1c  β1 – Z2c β2  +  W1c  ν1 – W2c ν2    
              +   B1cγ1 – B2cγ2  +  R1c δ1 – R2c δ2  +   Fc ψ  +  ζ1 λ1c – ζ2 λ2c    
              +  ζ1 θ1c – ζ2 θ2c  +   ηc  +   e1c -   e2c . 
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Diff. in frac. minority in tracts where blacks and whites live
Notes:  Sample is metropolitan areas in SAT states. Circle sizes are proportional to the sampling error variance in MSA 
black-white gaps (see notes to Table 1 for details).  Line is the weighted least squares regression line (slope -102, s.e. 10).
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Diff. in frac. minority in schools that blacks and whites attend
Notes:  See notes to Figure 1.  Line is the weighted least squares regression line (slope -101, s.e. 9).
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Diff. in frac. minority in schools that blacks and whites attend
Notes:  See notes to Figure 1.  "Residual school segregation" is the residual from a weighted bivariate regression of 
school segregation on residential segregation (coeff. 0.99, s.e. 0.01).  Line is the weighted least squares regression
line (slope -89, s.e. 31).
Figure 3.  School segregation unexplained by residential segregation 
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Residual - All controls
Notes:  Top row depicts blacks, middle whites, and bottom the black-white difference.  Solid line
is the mean for everyone; short dash for low education individuals; long dash for high education.
Segregation is measured in 2000; changes over time reflect changes in MSA weighting attributable
to changes in the geographic distribution of the population.  Details available from the authors.
Mean residential segregation (or residual), by race, year, and education level
Figure 4.  Mobility-induced changes in segregation, 1970-2000















(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Integrated schools
Fort Walton Beach, FL 9% 4% 19% 14% 5% 19% 13% 6%
Wilmington, NC 16% 2% 31% 25% 6% 40% 14% 25%
Brazoria, TX 8% 23% 36% 29% 7% 38% 29% 9%
Anchorage, AK 6% 6% 18% 10% 8% 17% 11% 6%
Gainesville, FL 19% 6% 40% 32% 9% 44% 21% 23%
Segregated schools
Gary, IN 19% 10% 90% 10% 80% 83% 13% 70%
Newark, NJ 22% 13% 85% 12% 73% 80% 14% 66%
New York, NY 23% 25% 85% 22% 64% 84% 20% 63%
Bergen-Passaic, NJ 8% 17% 74% 11% 63% 67% 14% 53%
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 20% 5% 73% 11% 62% 69% 11% 58%
Integrated schools, given residential segregation
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 6% 10% 35% 19% 16% 57% 11% 46%
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 11% 8% 39% 24% 15% 57% 13% 44%
Hagerstown, MD 8% 1% 14% 5% 9% 43% 6% 37%
Odessa-Midland, TX 6% 36% 47% 37% 10% 64% 31% 33%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 10% 10% 36% 20% 17% 54% 14% 39%
Segregated schools, given residential segregation
Tallahassee, FL 33% 4% 68% 27% 41% 55% 28% 27%
Jersey City, NJ 12% 40% 83% 38% 45% 69% 38% 31%
New Haven-Meriden, CT 13% 10% 70% 12% 58% 58% 13% 45%
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 11% 18% 62% 17% 46% 54% 20% 34%
Trenton, NJ 19% 10% 72% 14% 57% 64% 18% 47%
Average 14% 21% 63% 23% 40% 62% 22% 40%
Notes:  Segregation rankings in first two panels are by difference in fraction minority (black and Hispanic) in black and white 
students' schools, as in column E.  In second two panels, rankings are by the residual from a regression of this measure on an 
analogous measure computed over census tracts (column H).  In each case, the 5 most-segregated and least-segregated cities in 
SAT states with at least 5% black population are shown.  Average listed in bottom row is average over all cities meeting these 
criteria, weighted by (Nw
-1 + Nb
-1)








Census tract fr. minorityTable 2.  Summary statistics, metropolitan areas
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
N 331 189 142
Population (millions) 2.856 3.010 3.042 3.168 2.412 2.552
Fraction black 0.12 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.10
Fraction Hispanic 0.21 0.07 0.25 0.23 0.09 0.10
log(Mean HH income) 10.98 ---------- 10.99 0.20 10.96 0.16
Segregation (Black fraction minority - white fraction minority)
Residential (Tract), 2000 0.34 0.19 0.32 0.20 0.38 0.16
Elementary schools, 1998-2001 cohorts 0.36 0.21 0.35 0.20 0.40 0.23
High schools, 1998-2001 0.31 0.19 0.29 0.18 0.37 0.22
School career avg., 1998-2001 cohorts 0.35 0.20 0.33 0.19 0.39 0.22
SAT-taking rate
All students 0.28 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.14 0.11
White students 0.32 0.14 0.39 0.09 0.16 0.12
Black students 0.22 0.12 0.27 0.08 0.09 0.09
SAT-takers
Avg. SAT 1033.4 71.3 999.3 46.0 1114.8 53.0
Black-white avg. SAT -193.2 36.5 -194.0 34.3 -191.4 41.4
Black-white avg. SAT (reweighted) -203.0 42.1 -197.7 36.0 -215.5 52.1
All Cities In SAT states Not in SAT states
Notes:  All summary statistics are weighted by (Nw
-1 + Nb
-1)
-1, where Nw and Nb are the number of white and black residents of 
the MSA, respectively.  Average SATs and black-white SAT differences use SAT sampling weights within cities.  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I)
Dependent variable is B-W adjusted test score gap
-125 -78 -43 -88 -10 -7
(19) (24) (19) (34) (27) (25)
-121 -111 -70 -43 -103 -63
(18) (25) (20) (31) (27) (24)
N 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
R-squared 0.56 0.71 0.78 0.54 0.73 0.79 0.57 0.73 0.79
p-value, residential=school=0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dependent variable is B-W participation gap
-0.13 -0.20 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.14
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
-0.19 -0.31 -0.08 -0.27 -0.38 -0.20
(0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
N 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
R-squared 0.60 0.64 0.81 0.63 0.68 0.81 0.63 0.68 0.82
p-value, residential=school=0 0.00 0.00 0.05
MSA demographic characteristics n y y n y y n y y
B-W background controls, SAT takers (upper panel only) nyy nyy nyy
B-W background controls, 15-19 year olds in Census data n n y n n y n n y
B-W difference in residual parental wages nny nny nny
Notes:  All models are weighted by (Nw
-1 + Nb
-1)
-1.  City-level black-white differences in residual SATs (top panel) are computed 
over SAT-taker data that are re-weighted using school-by-race participation rates; see text for details.  All specifications include 
controls for census division fixed effects and main effects for the fraction black and fraction Hispanic in the city's schools; those 
in top panel also include a control for the black-white difference in an inverse Mills ratio computed from city-by-race-level SAT 
participation rates .  All standard errors are clustered on the CMSA.
Black-white difference:  Fr. minority in students' schools
Black-white difference:  Fr. minority in residents' nbhds.
Black-white difference:  Fr. minority in students' schools






School & Nbhd. 
Segregation
Table 3.  Basic estimates of school segregation's effect on black-white differences in SAT participation and residual 
scores(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J)
-1.8 -2.0 -3.2 -1.1 -1.3
(4.0) (3.5) (3.0) (2.9) (2.9)
-6.0 -11.8 -5.6 -3.2 -2.8 -4.4 -10.0 -2.7 -2.3 -1.6
(1.9) (3.0) (2.5) (2.6) (2.6) (3.8) (4.1) (3.8) (3.7) (3.7)
Control variables
MSA demographic characteristics n y y y y n y y y y
B-W gaps in parental educ. nny y y nny y y
B-W gaps in other observables nnny y nnny y
B-W gap in residual parental wages nnnny nnnny
N 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234
R-squared 0.30 0.37 0.50 0.55 0.55 0.30 0.37 0.50 0.55 0.55
p-value, residential=school=0 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.42 0.49
B-W fr. minority in students' schools
B-W fr. minority in residents' 
neighborhoods
Table 4.  Residential and school segregation effects on black-white difference in school persistence, 
measured from Census data
Notes:  All models are weighted by (Nw
-1 + Nb
-1)
-1.  Dependent variable is the difference between blacks and 
whites in the percentage of youth who have finished HS or who are enrolled in school, measured over 16-24 
year olds in the 2000 census who lived in the metropolitan area in 1995.   Sample excludes MSAs with fewer 
than 50 black or 50 white observations.  The persistence gap ranges in principle from -100 to 100, and has 
sample mean -6.9 and S.D. 3.8.  All specifications include controls for census division fixed effects and main 
effects for the fraction black and fraction Hispanic in the city's schools.  Columns C-E (and H-J) introduce 
control variables brought in in column F (and I) of Table 3 in three stages.  All standard errors are clustered on 
the CMSA.
School & Neighborhood 
Segregation
Neighborhood SegregationTable 5A.  Correlations of residential segregation over time
2000 1990 1980 1970 1960
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
N 331 314 291 264 200 149
Raw (weighted) correlations
Residential seg. index 1 1.00 0.93 0.90 0.75 0.73
2000 Isolation 1.00 1 1 0.89 0.75 0.72
1990 0.93 0.92 1 0.90 0.79 0.77
1980 0.90 0.89 0.90 1 0.94 0.91
1970 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.94 1 0.97
1960 0.73 0.72 0.77 0.91 0.97 1
1950 0.62 0.64 0.54 0.67 0.71 0.78
Residual correlations (between variables pre-residualized against control variables plus 2000 school segregation)
Residential seg. index 1 0.99 0.66 0.59 0.42 0.42
2000 Isolation 0.99 1 0.65 0.59 0.41 0.41
1990 0.66 0.65 1 0.65 0.54 0.49
1980 0.59 0.59 0.65 1 0.83 0.73
1970 0.42 0.41 0.54 0.83 1 0.88
1960 0.42 0.41 0.49 0.73 0.88 1
Notes:  Isolation measures are from Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999), and are computed over areas that were 
tracted within the contemporaneous MSA boundaries in each year.  









HS Elem. HS Elem.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
N 331 331 331 331 298 298
Raw (weighted) correlations
Lifetime, public and private 1 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99
Lifetime, public only 0.99 1 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99
Public HS, 1998-2001 0.96 0.97 1 0.97 0.99 0.94
Public elem., 1998-2001 0.97 0.98 0.97 1 0.98 0.96
Public HS, 1988-91 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 1 0.95
Public elem., 1988-91 0.99 0.99 0.94 0.96 0.95 1
Residual correlations (between variables pre-residualized against control variables plus 2000 residential segregation)
Lifetime, public and private 1 0.97 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.95
Lifetime, public only 0.97 1 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.97
Public HS, 1998-2001 0.79 0.83 1 0.79 0.95 0.66
Public elem., 1998-2001 0.78 0.79 0.79 1 0.77 0.71
Public HS, 1988-91 0.79 0.78 0.95 0.77 1 0.64
Public elem., 1988-91 0.95 0.97 0.66 0.71 0.64 1
Notes:  1988-91 school segregation measures are unavailable for MSAs in states that did not report the racial 
composition of schools in those years.  1998-2001 lifetime segregation average places 2/3 weight on the 1988-91 
elementary segregation measure and 1/3 on the 1998-2001 high school segregation measure; when the former is 
unavailable, a segregation measure is computed using the relevant cohort in the first available data.  For example, 
for Maine the 1988-91 elementary segregation measure is replaced by a measure for grades 5-8 in 1993-4; 6-9 in 
1994-5; 7-10 in 1995-6; and 8-11 in 1996-7.  








N6 0 6 0 6 0
Residential & school
Notes:  Models are weighted by (Nw
-1 + Nb
-1)
-1 and standard errors are clustered on the 
CMSA.  Control variables are those in Column H of Table 3, but with just a single 
control for the black-white difference in SAT-takers' background index in place of the 
full set of SAT-taker black-white differences in observables.
Change in dissimilarity index induced by 
major desegregation plans (/100)
Table 6.  Instrumental variables estimates of school segregation effect
B-W fr. minority in students' schools
B-W fr. minority in residents' 
neighborhoods(A) (B) (C) (D)
Panel A:  Percentage among black SAT-takers
-3.3 2.0 -2.8 2.6
(7.4) (7.4) (11.3) (12.1)
9.3 -2.5 -7.3 -11.6
(9.7) (7.8) (12.0) (12.9)
Panel B:  Percentage among white SAT-takers
-15.4 -10.5 -21.9 -14.0
(6.7) (8.7) (10.3) (9.5)
21.9 7.0 6.4 8.4
(6.9) (8.4) (11.0) (10.5)
Panel C:  Difference between black and white percentages
12.3 10.2 14.8 12.4
(6.4) (7.5) (7.3) (7.8)
-4.4 -5.3 -11.4 -14.9
(8.9) (7.6) (8.8) (8.6)
Math English Any subject
Table 7.  Residential and school segregation effects on honors course-taking among SAT-takers
Notes:  All models are weighted by (Nw
-1 + Nb
-1)
-1.  All columns include controls from column D of Table 3, except 
that controls measuring B-W gaps in Table 3 are included here as black averages, white averages, and black-white 
gaps in Panels A, B, and C, respectively.  All standard errors are clustered on the CMSA. 
B-W fr. minority in students' schools
B-W fr. minority in residents' census tracts
B-W fr. minority in students' schools
B-W fr. minority in residents' census tracts
B-W fr. minority in students' schools
B-W fr. minority in residents' census tracts
Plan to claim adv. / 
exempt status in any 
subject















(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F)
1.22 0.45 -3.08 4.44 0.12 -0.59
(0.99) (0.36) (5.30) (3.23) (0.12) (0.14)
-0.68 -0.67 -0.90 -1.45 -0.34 -0.04
(0.99) (0.42) (7.36) (3.92) (0.14) (0.18)
R-squared 0.33 0.37 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.62
p-value, residential=school=0 0.35 0.28 0.75 0.34 0.05 0.00
Notes:  All models are weighted by (Nw
-1 + Nb
-1)
-1.  Dependent variable in each column is the estimated difference between 
the average of the indicated variable in black students' schools (districts in col. A) and that in white students' schools.  School 
segregation measures are computed over current (1998-2001) enrollment in all grades, and restricted to public schools in 
Columns A and B.  All columns include controls from column D of Table 4.  All standard errors are clustered on the CMSA.
Table 8.  Estimates of residential and school segregation's effects on black-white differences in school resources 
and teacher characteristics
B-W fr. minority in students' 
schools
Resources (CCD) Teacher characteristics (SASS)







(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
0.64 0.03 -7 -16 -10
(0.05) (0.05) (25) (25) (25)
-0.25 -0.34 -63 -59 -34





N 292 323 185 176 185
R-squared 0.94 0.91 0.79 0.79 0.80
p-value, residential=school=0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15
Adjusted SAT score
Dependent variable:  B-W Gap in
Notes:  Models are weighted by (Nw
-1 + Nb
-1)
-1 and standard errors are clustered on the CMSA.  Control variables in 
columns C-E are those in Column I of Table 3.  Columns A & B omit control variables measured only over SAT-takers; 
in these columns, racial composition main effects and segregation measures are not the cohort averages used in SAT 
analyses, but are measured over all grades in 1998-2001 (using public schools only in column A).
Table 9.  Relationship between racial segregation and income differences between black & white students' 
schools and residents' tracts
Black-white difference:  Fr. minority in students' schools
Black-white difference:  Fr. minority in residents' nbhds.
Black-white difference: Fr. free lunch in students' schools






(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I)
-7 -7 -11
(25) (24) (22)
-63 -63 -53 -91 -30 -40











N 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.80 0.80






Black-white difference:  Fr. minority 
in students' high schools
Appendix Table 1.  Alternative specifications
Notes:  Model in Column A is that from Table 3, Column I.  Remaining columns modify the specification slightly, with the 
same set of control variables (except that in Columns H and I, the inverse Mill's ratio control is omitted and black-white gaps in 
SAT-takers' background characteristics are computed from un-reweighted data).  Dependent variable in Column F is the 








Black-white difference:  Fr. minority 
in students' schools
Black-white difference:  Fr. minority 
in residents' nbhds.
Black-white difference:  Fr. minority 
in students' elementary schools
Fr. minority in black residents' 
nbhds.
Fr. minority in white residents' 
nbhds.
Separate exposure 
effects